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"Commanders, Observers Discuss Enemy Tactics" from Intelligence Bulletin, May 1944

[Intelligence Bulletin Cover]  
The following U.S. military observations on German combat methods in Italy were originally published in the Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 9, May 1944.

[DISCLAIMER: The following text is taken from the U.S. War Department Intelligence Bulletin publication. As with all wartime intelligence information, data may be incomplete or inaccurate. No attempt has been made to update or correct the text. Any views or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the website.]

 
COMMANDERS, OBSERVERS DISCUSS ENEMY TACTICS

The following comments on German combat methods in Italy have been made by U.S. Army unit commanders and experienced observers. Only those tactics which have been noted repeatedly are mentioned here, since occasional, isolated instances of German methods cannot be regarded as illustrative of standard enemy procedure.

__________

When the Germans suspect that new troops are opposing them, enemy patrols become very active, to determine the identity and strength of the new troops.

__________

The Germans have used artillery and some rocket guns to harass our forward areas and to interdict vital supply roads, but fire has decreased as soon as the enemy has lost dominant observation.

__________

The enemy often restricts his movements entirely to those he can make under cover of darkness or during days when weather makes hostile air activity impossible.... The Germans do not pull out in daylight, even when they have practically been surrounded. They fight like tigers to hold a narrow escape corridor, through which they try to withdraw at night.

__________

Enemy agents make every effort to infiltrate into civilian traffic and movement.

__________

Long-range weapons are active mainly on clear days. No change has been noted in the German policy of continually changing positions and of employing a considerable number of single guns.

__________

It is necessary to stress again and again that road craters are surrounded and lined with antipersonnel mines—often just over the lip of the crater, where they are harder to detect. The Germans have used a large number of abatis in Italy, most of which have been infested with antipersonnel devices.

__________

During the first part of December, the German artillery had the commanding observation, and, as we advanced, the enemy's activity was definitely in proportion to the visibility and observation advantages remaining in his hands. The enemy adjusted by observation the major portion of his artillery fire. Subsequent night harassing missions (German) were based on this data. German counterbattery fire decreased considerably whenever the advance of friendly troops deprived the enemy of commanding heights.... The Germans are continuing the policy of seeking to neutralize an installation temporarily, rather than exploiting opportunities for damage when an increased use of ammunition would be involved. Fire of medium caliber has been decreasing, with a corresponding increase in light caliber, principally 105-mm guns.

__________

The Germans will send out patrols to feign a night attack, or a daylight attack, just to locate your barrages so that they can side-step them when the real attack comes.

__________

The German positions we have run into in the mountains have had very few riflemen in the front line. The forward element of the defense has consisted almost entirely of machine guns in rock bunkers; these bunkers are so cleverly blended into the terrain that they are extremely difficult to locate. In the daytime the Germans seem to hold practically all their riflemen back about 200 yards. They depend on their machine guns, mortars, and artillery to stop your attack or to cause you such losses that a quick counterattack by the riflemen will throw you out. At night they put out listening posts manned by riflemen, but still hold back most of the riflemen.

__________

On Hill 769 one of our companies got up close to the German bunkers. The company could not move in daylight because of the lack of cover, so a night attack was decided upon. Since there would be moonlight, it was decided to place smoke on the bunkers at the time of attack. This was done, but, as soon as the smoke screen was formed, the Germans left their bunkers, moved their right front and left front to the edge of the smoke screen nearest our positions, and placed machine-pistol fire on our attacking unit's flank.

__________

The outstanding feature of mountainous country in Italy is that a village is almost invariably on the dominating ground, or on ground vital to the attacker to secure his line of communication. Such villages consist of closely packed houses with narrow streets between them. The houses themselves have thick walls and are immune to shellfire, except in the case of a direct hit. The enemy realizes this and makes full use of them as strong points, firing from windows and improvised loopholes. Such villages are also covered by machine-gun and mortar fire from either flank. In some cases houses are scattered on dominating features, and the enemy often uses them as machine-gun posts, covering the approaches by means of snipers and additional machine guns in adjacent houses.

__________

In front of organized German positions, we have found mines only in the natural avenues of approach. These avenues are also covered with machine-gun and mortar fire. Thus the Germans are better prepared to deal with an opposing force using draws or gullies than one which is working its way along the sides of ridges. On the ridges and less jagged mountains, the Germans often dispose their strength on the reverse slopes in order to bring heavy fire on our forces as they cross over the crests.

__________

Strong stone bunkers are continually being encountered in mountainous terrain. Although it is reported that grenades and rockets will not penetrate the walls of such bunkers, it has been found that both grenades and rockets are effective when exploded close to the slits, which are near ground level. The occupants are at least stunned. As a U.S. sergeant who has had considerable experience with both weapons recently expressed it, "If you close in fast after using them on bunkers, you will find the Germans either knocked cold or goofy." Another noncom observes, "Grenades exploding within 3 feet or so of the slit will get the Germans if they are looking out."

In town fighting, buildings and strong points occupied by the Germans have proved vulnerable both to the grenade and rocket launcher.

__________

The German soldier does not like to fight at night, and does not fight as well at night as he does during the day. In several instances German security at night has been found to be lacking. A number of instances have also shown that the German soldier, when surprised at night, has become confused and has been an easy victim of an opponent well trained in night fighting.

__________

When patrols are sent out to locate the German defensive positions,1 the Germans do not fire on these patrols if they can avoid it, but let them go on through. German prisoners have stated that they were ordered not to fire except in case of a major attack. They have also recited instances of seeing our patrols go by their positions at a given time on a certain night. Checking back, we have found that our patrols were there at the stated time.

On the other hand, if one of our patrols stumbles into a German position, the Germans try to destroy the patrol to the last man, to keep the information from getting back to our units.

__________

Repeatedly, when an entire patrol has returned to report that a hill is unoccupied or that a bridge has not been blown, some unit moves forward and finds the hill alive with Germans, who smother the unit with fire from machine pistols, light machine guns, and mortars—or, in the case of a bridge, the unit will find that the Germans have demolished it in the meantime. In other words, the Germans are quick to exploit the situation if an opposing force fails to seize and hold ground until stronger elements have been brought up to hold it in force.

__________

Experience has shown that the Germans will almost invariably launch a counterattack to break up an attack made by small infantry units. You can expect such a counterattack, usually by 10 to 20 men, not more than 5 minutes after you get close to the German positions. They are usually well armed with light machine guns and machine pistols, and counterattack by fire and movement. They keep up a heavy fire while small details, even individuals, alternately push forward. The Germans almost always attack your flank. They seldom close in with the bayonet, but try to drive you out by fire....

__________

The Germans keep a sharp lookout for radio antennas, and shell every one they see.

The enemy is skillful at radio intercept, and tries to draw a great deal of information by inference. He notes the peculiarities of individual radio operators, which can easily become a dead give-away to the location of units.

1This commander is speaking of heavy stone bunkers.

 

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