The following corrections were published in Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 20, March 11, 1943. [DISCLAIMER: The following text is taken from the U.S. War Department publication Tactical and Technical Trends. As with all wartime intelligence information, data may be incomplete or inaccurate. No attempt has been made to update or correct the text. Any views or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the website.]

CORRECTIONS No. 13, p. 31: Two paragraphs on this page, the third full paragraph and the last paragraph, tend to give the impression that the tanks of German armored forces operate independently and without the support of other arms. This, of course, is erroneous, since, as has been indicated elsewhere in Tactical and Technical Trends, isolated tank units become extremely vulnerable. It is true that, in the Battle of France, German tanks occasionally outstripped their own infantry and support columns by tens of miles. However, since then, the campaigns in Russia and North Africa have shown that the tactics used by all armies are to maintain the closest possible contact between fighting echelons of tanks and infantry, and other support echelons. Neither in attack nor defense do tanks function independently of infantry, antitank, and artillery support; all these units are part of a combat team. It is noteworthy that defensive tactics against armored formations are now based on an effort to split tanks from their support echelons.

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