No campaign is fought without entailing problems concerning the adoption
of measures for the control of the civilian population. A recent report from
a Middle East theater, outlines some of the issues involving British procedure
and policy in this regard.
a. Control of Civilians
The key question is the control of civilian movement. The policy is to
prevent civilians from hindering the efficiency of troops and at the same time to
upset civilian life as little as possible (at least in the countries of
Allies). Provost officers must bear in mind political as well as purely military
considerations in friendly countries, and should use civil police officers as
much as possible.
b. Refugees
It is the duty of the staff to see that adequate arrangements are made for
the control of refugees. "G" Branch (General Staff Branch--roughly equivalent
to U.S. G-2 and G-3) will indicate which roads must be kept free of civilian
traffic and refugees. "A" (Adjutant General's Branch--roughly comparable to
U.S. G-1)* will then ascertain from which direction the flow of civilians may
be expected and will then issue instructions for their diversion to roads
or trails not being used for military traffic. Usually it will be quite
outside the capacity of the provost company to undertake this task, and
units or sub-units, each working under its own commander must be specially
detailed for the purpose.
c. Inhabitants of Friendly Countries
The keynote of all dealings with an allied population is that everything
should be done through the responsible civil official. In warfare of movement, control
of civilians is necessary but difficult to organize in the time available. The
aim is to prevent information being given to the enemy, either unwittingly or
by agents. For this purpose "G" (I.) [Intelligence] will impose certain
restrictions on movement and telephone communications which will have to be enforced
by the Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal with the Military Police, in conjunction
with the civil police of the country, if still functioning. The DAPM must
therefore be well forward, and provide himself with the necessary proclamations
relating to restrictions in the use of telephones and roads, to be read out
and posted in towns and villages. When operations have become stabilized, the
principle is to interfere as little as possible with civil organization in the rear
zones. In the forward zones, military control has to be more stringent, and
restrictions on the normal life of civilians have to be imposed. Control in rear
zones is usually exercised by "G" (I.) and Field Security Police; in the forward
zones by the Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal and the Military Police. Evacuation
of civilians from the forward zone would be the most satisfactory solution, but
this is seldom practicable.
d. Inhabitants of Hostile Countries
Evacuation from the zone of operations is the safest and most satisfactory
solution, but this is difficult to arrange. "A" must make the fullest use of
the existing system of civil administration supplemented by special military
regulations. Provost service and Field Security Police are responsible for
enforcing such regulations. Disarmament of the civil population must be carried
out. (Note: Field Security Police bear a relationship to the provost
service similar to that of detectives to the civil police.)
e. Cooperation Between MP and Civilian Law-Enforcement Agencies
It has been the British principle so far in Middle East theaters to persuade
civil police authorities to retain and maintain control over civil
populations -- the Military Police confining their activities to the
control of military personnel. The head of "A" Branch, accompanied
by the Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal, interviews the local civil
governor or Chief of Police, and having received a promise of full
cooperation, ascertains the local laws. Provided the attitude of the
civil population permits, particular local laws are brought to the
notice of troops for observance. The central local police headquarters
will generally become a "central clearing house" for complaints from both
sides, and provided prompt action is taken against offenders, active
cooperation will usually be secured. It will generally be necessary for a close
watch to be kept by Intelligence agencies and Military Police agencies
on the activities of the local police to see that they are cooperating
fully; if they are not, it probably will be necessary to take over
greater control, in which case it may be necessary to ask Army HQ to
send additional men for police duties.
* See Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 11, p. 32 for
reference to the British General Staff, Arms and Services.