In the Japanese maneuvers carried out in June 1941 near Akita to test basic training and to formulate tactical doctrine, four problems were investigated: (1) the dropping of a unit of approximately two infantry platoons to carry out a demolition mission in enemy rear areas; (2) the dropping of a similar-sized unit to cover the landing of an infantry battalion transported by plane; (3) a problem like the preceding, except that the parachutists were protected by low-flying airplanes using machine guns; (4) the dropping of an infantry company to seize important terrain features in the rear of an enemy position prior to an attack by ground troops. If the reported views as to the success of the maneuvers are correct, the Japanese concluded: first, that the employment of parachute troops for demolition movements was advantageous neither from the point of view of certainty in accomplishing a mission, nor from the point of view of economy in men and equipment; second, that the use of parachute troops in the absence of support from air-landing troops or from ground troops was a doubtful procedure; third, that no necessity existed for the formation of highly trained parachute units, for the reason that with very little basic training the men and equipment of infantry units could be utilized. The final point, though a little puzzling, may reflect the alleged Japanese Army dislike for highly specialized units and preference for all-around units.